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Animals and humans learn to approach and
acquire pleasant stimuli and to avoid or defend
against aversive ones. However, both pleasant
and aversive stimuli can elicit arousal and atten-
tion, and their salience or intensity increases
when they occur by surprise. Thus, adaptive be-
havior may require that neural circuits compute
both stimulus valence—or value—and intensity.
To explore how these computations may be im-
plemented, we examined neural responses in
the primate amygdala to unexpected reinforce-
ment during learning. Many amygdala neurons
responded differently to reinforcement depend-
ing upon whether or not it was expected. In
some neurons, this modulation occurred only
for rewards or aversive stimuli, but not both. In
other neurons, expectation similarly modulated
responses to both rewards and punishments.
These different neuronal populations may sub-
serve two sorts of processes mediated by
the amygdala: those activated by surprising
reinforcements of both valences—such as en-
hanced arousal and attention—and those that
are valence-specific, such as fear or reward-
seeking behavior.
INTRODUCTION
Food, water, mates, and predators do not always appear
predictably in a natural environment. Instead, animals and
humans often encounter these stimuli by surprise, trigger-
ing a range of cognitive, physiological, and behavioral re-
sponses that contribute to an emotional experience. One
influential framework describes emotions in a two-dimen-970 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Isional space, with arousal (ranging from calm to excited)
and valence, or value, (ranging from highly negative to
highly positive) comprising the two axes (Russell, 1980).
In support of this framework, some components of the
emotional response, such as approach or defensive be-
haviors, depend on computations of the positive or nega-
tive value of stimuli. Other components of the emotional
response, such as metabolic arousal, increased attention,
and the enhancement of memory formation, are common
to intense stimuli of both valences. Distinct psychophysi-
ological measures correlate with arousal and valence, re-
spectively (Lang and Davis, 2006). Finally, in addition to
triggering these different aspects of emotional responses,
surprising reinforcement can also induce learning—such
that past experience is used to behave adaptively in the
future—a point emphasized in many theoretical models
of reinforcement learning (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and
Hall, 1980; Rescorla andWagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto,
1998).
Neurobiological and psychological accounts of emotion
often posit opponent motivational systems, one for appe-
titive, or reward-related, processes and one for aversive
processes (Daw et al., 2002; Dickinson and Dearing, 1979;
Grossberg, 1984; Konorski, 1967; Solomon and Corbit,
1974). Within this conceptualization, affective valence and
arousal are determined by the relative activation and in-
tensity of activation, respectively, of these two systems
(Lang and Davis, 2006). Arousing pleasant or aversive
stimuli can therefore elicit valence-specific responses
while also enhancing autonomic reactivity (e.g., blood
pressure, skin conductance responses), attention, and
memory formation through a common, perhaps valence-
insensitive, pathway. Thus, appetitive and aversive brain
systemsmay act in an opponent manner, for valence-spe-
cific processes, as well as in a congruent manner, for pro-
cesses sensitive to affective intensity but not valence.
The amygdala, a brain structure located in the medial
temporal lobe that has been implicated in emotional pro-
cesses, is well positioned to integrate information fromnc.
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tional responses. Information about primary pleasant and
aversive stimuli converges in the amygdala, which re-
ceives input from sensory systems of all modalities (Ama-
ral et al., 1992; McDonald, 1998; Stefanacci and Amaral,
2002). Furthermore, prefrontal and rhinal cortices, as well
as neuromodulatory systems and the hippocampus, all
project to the amygdala (Amaral et al., 1992; Ghashghaei
and Barbas, 2002; McDonald, 1998; Stefanacci and Ama-
ral, 2000, 2002), potentially influencing amygdala pro-
cessing in relation to expectations, memories, and other
cognitive processes. Output from the amygdala to sub-
cortical structures and to the striatum, hippocampus,
and cortex could help coordinate a range of physiological,
cognitive, and behavioral responses (Amaral et al., 1992;
Davis, 2000). Some of these responses are valence spe-
cific, such as freezing behavior (a component of fear re-
sponses; LeDoux, 2000), and others are insensitive to
valence, such as activation of the sympathetic nervous
system in relation to arousal (Lang and Davis, 2006).
Wewere interested in understandingwhether the amyg-
dala processes primary reinforcement in a manner that
could support its role in both valence-based and arousal-
based emotional responses. To examine this issue, we fo-
cused on the effect of predictability on the responses of
amygdala neurons to rewards and aversive stimuli. We
measured amygdala responses to rewards and aversive
stimuli during two experimental procedures that manipu-
lated monkeys’ ability to anticipate reinforcement. In one
procedure, a trace-conditioning task, monkeys learned
that the presentation of a conditioned stimulus (CS)
predicted an unconditioned stimulus (US, a reward or an
aversive stimulus). In the other procedure, rewards and
aversive stimuli were delivered in an uncued and unpre-
dictablemanner. Although thisproceduredid notplacebe-
havioral demands on the monkeys, we refer to it as the
‘‘random task’’ for convenience. Since variables other
than reinforcement expectation, such as attention or cog-
nitive load, may also differ between these two tasks, we
use a comparison of responses to reinforcement during
the trace-conditioning and random tasks to identify cells
with potential effects of expectation. To confirm that in
these cells expectation modulates reinforcement re-
sponses, we then examine neural responses to reinforce-
ment in relation to learning and behavioral signs of expec-
tation during the trace-conditioning task.
We found that expectation indeed influences the re-
sponses of amygdala neurons to reinforcement. Some
cells showed a similar effect of expectation on responses
to rewards and punishments. In other cells, however, ex-
pectation modulated the responses to either rewards or
aversive stimuli, but not both. Neurons with congruent
effects of expectation on responses to reinforcement of
both valences are well-suited to support processes such
as attention, attention-based learning, arousal, and the en-
hancement of memory formation, all of which have been
shown to involve the amygdala (Holland and Gallagher,
1999, 2006; Kensinger and Corkin, 2004; McGaugh,Neur2004; Oya et al., 2005; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). On the
other hand, neurons that preferentially modulate their re-
sponses to either pleasant or aversive stimuli could play
a role in processes that require information about stimulus
valence (i.e., positive or negative value). Many of these
processes, which include learning when to exhibit defen-
sive as opposed to approach behaviors, among others,
are also likely to involve the amygdala (Baxter and Murray,
2002; Everitt et al., 2003; LeDoux, 2000; Paton et al., 2006).
In the trace-conditioning task, if predictability modu-
lates neural responses to reinforcement, then these re-
sponses should change as monkeys learn to accurately
anticipate reinforcement. Indeed, in the cells that respond
more to reinforcers during the random task than during the
trace-conditioning task, we found that responses to re-
wards and aversive stimuli were stronger before learning,
when monkeys did not expect the reinforcement, and that
these responses decreased as monkeys learned. This
expectation-dependent modulation of reinforcement re-
sponses bears similarity to a ‘‘prediction error signal,’’
which in theoretical accounts of reinforcement learning
represents the difference between expected and received
reinforcement (Pearce and Hall, 1980; Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1998). However, the
response profile of amygdala neurons that we studied can-
not be described as simply encoding ‘‘pure’’ prediction
errors because they carried other, additional signals. For
example,wehavepreviously shown that amygdala neurons
are selective for the identity and value of visual CSs (Paton
et al., 2006), and here we also show that these neurons
can also respond to USs selectively. Instead, the influence
of predictability on amygdala responses to reinforcement
suggests that amygdala neurons may combine prediction
error signal input with other signals carried by the amyg-
dala during learning. These inputs may converge onto
amygdala neurons in distinct patterns so as to support
both valence-specific and arousal-specific processes.
RESULTS
Predictability Modulates Amygdala Neural
Responses to Pleasant and Aversive Stimuli
To examine the effect of reinforcement expectation on
neural responses in the amygdala, we measured neural
activity during performance of two behavioral tasks: one
in which reinforcement was predictable (trace-condition-
ing task) and another in which it was not (random task).
In the trace-conditioning task, monkeys learned that
USs (liquid rewards or aversive air-puffs directed at the
face) were predicted by visual CSs. To assess learning,
wemeasured two behaviors: licking a spout in anticipation
of reward and blinking in anticipation of an air-puff
(Figure 1A). (In different experiments, reinforcements oc-
curredwith a probability of 100%or 80%,whichwewill re-
fer to as the 100% and 80% reinforced trace-conditioning
tasks.) Subsequent to learning the initial CS-US contin-
gencies, we reversed themwithout warning, andmonkeys
learned these new contingencies. In the random task, weon 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 971
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Amygdala Activity Modulated by Expectationrecorded activity while presenting rewards and punish-
ments with an equal probability but now in an uncued
and unpredictable manner (Figure 1B). Monkeys did not
lick or blink in anticipation of reinforcement during the ran-
dom task, indicating that they did not predict reinforce-
ment.
We recorded the activity of 285 amygdala neurons from
5monkeys during both the trace-conditioning and random
tasks (100% reinforced task, 116 cells, 63 and 53 from
monkeys V and P, respectively; 80% reinforced task,
169 cells, 46, 41, 25, 33, and 24 cells from monkeys V,
P, Lo, R, and Lu, respectively). We examined activity in
the 50–600ms after reinforcement. The responses to rein-
forcement often differed in the two tasks, with some neu-
rons exhibiting differential responses to rewards only,
other neurons to punishments only, and some neurons
to both rewards and punishments. For example, Figures
2A and 2B show activity from an amygdala neuron that re-
sponded more strongly when reward was delivered unex-
Figure 1. Behavioral Tasks and Recording Site Reconstruc-
tion
(A) Trace-conditioning task. Sequence of events for trials. For CSs fol-
lowed by large rewards or punishments, reinforcement contingencies
reverse without warning after initial learning. Not depicted: a third trial
type, in which non-reinforcement or a small reward followed a CS.
(B) Random task. Rewards and air-puffs were presented with equal
probability in a random order.
(C) Anatomical reconstruction of recording sites in monkey L, with
amygdala extent and site locations estimated by MRI. Left, coronal
slice. Right, sagittal slice. Symbols indicate properties of recorded
cells.
Green, rEM cells; red, aEM cells; black, nEMcells; blue, no effect of ex-
pectation; solid and open circles, 100% and 80% probability trace-
conditioning tasks, respectively.972 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevierpectedly (random task) than when the same reward was
delivered in a cued manner (trace-conditioning task).
This cell did not respond to air-puffs during either task.
Other amygdala neurons showed stronger responses to
unexpected air-puffs but did notmodulate their responses
to reward (e.g., Figures 2C and 2D). Finally, many cells
had stronger responses to both unexpected rewards
and air-puffs, as exemplified by the cell shown in Figures
2E and 2F.
The response profiles of the neurons depicted in Fig-
ure 2 suggest that expectation has differential effects on
different populations of amygdala neurons. To examine
this systematically, we used a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) analysis to categorize each neuron
according to whether it responded significantly more to
unexpected reward only, air-puff only, or both during the
random task as compared to each respective reinforcer
when it was expected during the trace-conditioning task
(p < 0.05, one-tailed permutation test). Forty-seven out
of two hundred eighty-five cells had differential responses
for reward responses alone (expectation-modulated for
reward cells, rEM), 35/285 cells for air-puff responses
alone (expectation-modulated for aversive stimuli cells,
aEM), and 65/285 cells for both types of reinforcement
(nonvalenced expectation-modulated cells, nEM).
Figures 3A–3F show normalized and averaged neural
activity for the rEM, aEM, and nEM cells. These plots com-
bine data from all five monkeys because the proportion of
rEM, aEM, and nEM neurons did not vary significantly be-
tweenmonkeys (c2 test, p > 0.05; see Table S1 in the Sup-
plemental Data available with this article online). rEM,
aEM, and nEM neurons were represented in our sample
of neurons more often than would be expected by chance
(c2 test, p > 0.05 for each response profile type). In addi-
tion, across the population, the effects of expectation on
responses to rewards and air-puffs were not independent
(c2 test, p < 0.001). Neurons that showed (or did not show)
stronger responses to unexpected rewards tended to
show (or not show) stronger responses to air-puffs, with
the incidence of nEM cells occurring at a rate greater
than expected by chance given the observed frequencies
of each type (binomial test, p < 105). Together, the find-
ings suggest that different populations of neurons in the
amygdala could subserve valence-specific and valence-
nonspecific functions. We have not noticed any clear
anatomical clustering of reward-related versus punish-
ment-related effects of expectation on reinforcement
responses; these cells appeared to be intermingled within
the amygdala (Figure 1C).
In general, the modulation of reinforcement responses
in the random task compared to the trace-conditioning
task was greater when reinforcement during trace condi-
tioning occurred with a probability of 100% (Figures 3G–
3I). These data are consistent with the notion that CSs
do not fully predict reinforcement when delivery occurs
with a probability of 80%; consequently, the difference
in the predictability of rewards and air-puffs between the
two tasks is smaller.Inc.
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Responses to Reinforcement in the
Amygdala
(A and B) PSTHs (which average neural
responses as a function of time across trials)
from one amygdala cell exhibiting a stronger
response to reward (A) but not air-puff (B)
when reinforcement was unexpected (random
task, blue) compared to expected (trace-
conditioning task, magenta).
(C and D) PSTHs from a neuron with stronger
responses to unexpected air-puff (D) but not
to unexpected reward (C).
(E and F) PSTH from a cell with stronger
responses to both valences of unexpected
reinforcement. All PSTHs smoothed with
a 10 ms moving average.The interpretation that expectation modulates neural
responses to reinforcement was also supported by an
analysis of data from within the trace-conditioning task,
using monkeys’ anticipatory behavior as a proxy for their
expectation. Recall that on the trace-conditioning task,
monkeys learned to lick in anticipation of reward and blink
in anticipation of an aversive air-puff. Assuming that lick-
ing but not blinking indicates expectation of reward, and
vice-versa for expectation of air-puff, we asked whether
reinforcement responses were higher when monkeys in-
correctly predicted the upcoming reinforcement. Combin-
ing all the rEM, aEM, and nEM cells, we divided trials into
two categories: one containing trials in which the monkey
blinked but did not lick, and the other containing trials in
which the monkey licked but did not blink. For each rein-
forcement type, we normalized responses within experi-
ments in the same manner as for population peristimulusNeurtime histograms (PSTHs) and then combined data across
experiments to compare activity in the two categories. For
both reward and air-puff, we found that reinforcement
responses were significantly greater when the monkey
predicted the wrong type of reinforcement (Figures 4A
and 4B; analysis performed in 100 ms bins, stepped in
20 ms steps). These effects were weakened but not elim-
inated if the first four trials of initial learning and the first
four trials after reversal were removed (most ‘‘incorrect’’
predictions occurred during these learning trials). In addi-
tion, the effects were smaller on the task with 80% rein-
forcement probability (Figure S1). Overall, this analysis
further supports the notion that responses to reinforce-
ment in the amygdala are modulated by expectation
and that violations of expectation have a greater impact
on neural responses on the 100% reinforcement prob-
ability task.Figure 3. Valence-Specific and Valence-
Nonspecific Modulation of Reinforce-
ment Responses by Expectation
(A–F) Normalized and averaged population
PSTHs showing responses to expected
(magenta, trace-conditioning task) and unex-
pected (blue, random task) rewards (A, C,
and E) and punishments (B, D, and F). (A and
B) rEM neurons (n = 47). (C andD) aEMneurons
(n = 35). (E and F) nEM neurons (n = 65). Shad-
ing, SEM.
(G–I) Difference in normalized activity for unex-
pected compared to expected rewards and
air-puffs, shown separately for data from the
100% and 80% reinforcement probability
trace-conditioning task. rEM cells (G), aEM
cells (H), nEM cells (I). The difference in air-
puff response seen in (H) does not achieve sta-
tistical significance (p = 0.14, t test).on 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 973
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sponses to Reinforcement within the
Trace-Conditioning Task
(A and B) Normalized and averaged PSTHs
showing responses to rewards (A) and air-puffs
(B) for the rEM, aEM, and nEM cells studied
with the 100% reinforced trace-conditioning
task. Trials are sorted according to whether
monkeys expected air-puff (anticipatory blink-
ing but not licking, red curves) or reward (antic-
ipatory licking but not blinking, blue curves). On
average, the responses to reinforcement were
greater when monkeys incorrectly predicted
the upcoming reinforcement. Red asterisks,
activity significantly different in the two types
trials in a 100 ms bin, p < 0.05, t test. Shading,
SEM.Amygdala Neurons Weakly Represent Omitted
Rewards and Punishments
So far we have focused on comparisons of responses to
expected and unexpected reinforcement. Next, we exam-
ined whether the omission of an expected reinforcement
also modulates amygdala neural activity by considering
data from the 169 neurons studied during the 80% rein-
forced trace-conditioning task. In this task, reinforcement
was omitted on 20% of trials. To detect reinforcement
omission, monkeys must internally time when reinforce-
ment should occur in relation to a CS presentation. The
inherent variability of internal timing, combined with inher-
ent variability of neural response latencies to reinforce-
ment, led us to use an analysis of response latency to
find neurons that responded to omitted rewards and
punishments. This analysis identified whether and when
a neuron significantly changed its response around the
time of expected reinforcement when such reinforcement
was omitted (p < 0.05, see Experimental Procedures). Of
note, many amygdala neurons have low baseline firing
rates (56% of neurons had baseline firing rates below
10 Hz), limiting the sensitivity of statistical approaches
for detecting significant decreases in firing rate.
Figures 5A and 5B show a cell identified by the analysis
of latency that fires somewhat more strongly to unex-
pected as compared to expected reward and that de-
creases its firing rate to omitted rewards. In addition, the
same cell increases its firing rate when an air-puff is omit-
ted, and it decreases its firing rate to both predicted and
unpredicted air-puffs. Thus, this cell’s response profile re-
veals opponent effects of rewards, punishments, and their
omission in relation to expectation. Figures 5C and 5D
show similar opponent effects for a cell that increases its
response to unexpected air-puff but not reward. Strik-
ingly, an omitted reward also elicits an increase in
response, and an omitted punishment elicits a modest
decrease in response.
Theories of reinforcement learning often posit that
valence-specific signals that represent the receipt or
omission of reinforcement in relation to expectation play
an instructive role in learning (Rescorla and Wagner,974 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier In1972; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Assuming that appetitive
and aversive systems act as mutual opponents in the
brain, as has been proposed previously (Daw et al.,
2002; Grossberg, 1984; Solomon and Corbit, 1974), we
grouped neurons according to whether or not their re-
sponses to omitted reinforcement were consistent with
their providing a valence-specific signal. Thirty-two out
of one hundred sixty-nine (19%) neurons responded
with significantly less firing to omitted rewards and/or sig-
nificantly greater firing to omitted air-puffs (Figures 5E and
5F; see Table 1), as determined by the analysis of re-
sponse latency. These neurons encode outcomes of omit-
ted reinforcement that are better than expected by in-
creasing firing rate and/or of omitted reinforcement
worse than expected by decreasing firing rate. Figures
5G and 5H show the response profile for the 26/169
(15%) neurons identified by the latency analysis as de-
creasing firing rate significantly after omitted air-puffs
and/or increasing firing rate significantly after omitted re-
ward. The neurons in Figures 5E and 5F and Figures 5G
and 5H are nonoverlapping populations (Table 1). Neurons
from each of the five monkeys contributed to each panel
depicted in Figures 5E–5H. From 50–600 ms after rein-
forcement, all curves within Figures 5E–5H are signifi-
cantly different from each other (t tests, p < 0.05 in each
case), and on average omitted reinforcement resulted in
a significant decrease in firing in Figures 5E and 5H (p <
0.01, t tests).
These data show that a small number of neurons in the
amygdala modulate their firing rate when reinforcement is
omitted. Such neurons often appear to integrate informa-
tion about appetitive and aversive stimuli in relation to
expectation in an opponent fashion, with omitted rein-
forcement having an opposite influence on firing rate for
rewards and aversive stimuli. Across all 169 neurons,
however, on average omitted reinforcement did not result
in a significant change in firing rate (Figures 5I and 5J,
t tests comparing activity from the last 500 ms of the trace
interval to activity 50–600 ms after the time of reinforce-
ment, p > 0.05 for both omitted reward and air-puff
responses). In addition, the responses after omittedc.
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Amygdala Activity Modulated by ExpectationFigure 5. Neural Responses to Omitted Reinforcement
(A and B) PSTHs from an amygdala cell showing increased firing to un-
expected rewards (A) and omitted air-puffs (B), and decreased firing to
air-puffs (B) and omitted rewards (A).
(C and D) PSTH from an amygdala cell showing increased firing to un-
expected air-puffs (D) and omitted rewards (C), and decreased firing to
rewards (C) and omitted air-puffs (D).
(E and F) Normalized and averaged population PSTHs for neurons
showing evidence of decreased firing to omitted rewards and/or in-
creased firing to omitted air-puffs (n = 32; Table 1).
(G and H) Normalized and averaged population PSTHs for neurons
showing evidence of decreased firing to omitted air-puffs and/or in-
creased firing to omitted rewards (n = 26; Table 1).
(I and J) Normalized and averaged PSTHs showing responses to re-
wards (I) and air-puffs (J) from all cells recorded during both the
trace-conditioning task with 80% reinforcement probability and the
random task (n = 169).Neureinforcement differed from the responses to expected
rewards and air-puffs (t test, p < 0.05). Thus, omitted rein-
forcement has both a smaller and less-frequent effect on
firing rate than the increase in firing rate observed when
reinforcement occurred unexpectedly.
Reinforcement Responses Dissipate in Relation
to Learning about Value at the Behavioral
and Neural Levels
During the trace-conditioning task, monkeys learned to
predict reinforcement, as indicated by their anticipatory
licking and blinking (Paton et al., 2006). However, immedi-
ately after we reversed the value assignments of CSs,
which occurred without warning, monkeys’ predictions
about reinforcement were violated. We noticed that
many neurons had stronger responses to rewards and
air-puffs immediately after such image value reversals.
Figures 6A and 6B show the responses of two cells with
stronger responses to reinforcement after reversal for re-
ward and air-puff, respectively. Both neurons also en-
coded CS value, and neural activity reflecting CS value
changed as reinforcement responses dissipated (see
also Figure S2 for additional examples).
For cells recorded during the 100% reinforced trace-
conditioning task, 65 cells had stronger responses to
air-puffs and/or rewards during the random task (Table
S1); on average, these cells had elevated responses to
reward and air-puff immediately after reversal, with
responses dissipating in five or fewer trials (Figures 6C
and 6D). The stronger responses to rewards and air-puffs
after reversals in reinforcement contingencies were likely
due to the surprising reinforcement received, rather than
to the expected reinforcement that was omitted. As shown
in Figure 5, on average, omitted reinforcement has only
a small effect on firing rate. Furthermore, neurons which
did not respondmore strongly to reinforcers in the random
task also did not show a stronger response to reinforce-
ment after reversal in the trace-conditioning task
(Figure S3). Finally, in the 65 cells with stronger responses
to reinforcement on the random task, the mean difference
between reinforcement responses on the trace-condition-
ing and random tasks was correlated with the change in
response to reinforcement observed immediately after
reversals during the trace-conditioning task (Figure S4).
Overall, therefore, comparing responses across the
trace-conditioning and random tasks, and comparing
responses with respect to reversals in reinforcement con-
tingencies, reveals similar effects on neural response
properties. The consistency in these data further supports
the conclusion that expectation modulates responses to
rewards and aversive stimuli in the amygdala.
For all plots: magenta, black, and blue curves, responses to expected,
omitted, and random reinforcement, respectively. Black arrows in (E)
and (H), mean latency of decreased responses to omitted rewards
and air-puffs. PSTHs smoothed with a 50 ms Gaussian.ron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 975
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Amygdala Activity Modulated by ExpectationTable 1. Categorization of Cells According to Their Response to Omitted Reinforcement
Cells were categorized as increasing, decreasing, or not changing firing rate by comparing activity after an omitted reinforcement to
activity in the last 1 s of the trace interval.To examine the relationship between changing rein-
forcement responses and behavioral learning, we
constructed behavioral ‘‘learning curves’’ for positive-to-
negative and negative-to-positive reversals. To construct
these curves, we scored every trial according to whether
monkeys licked and/or blinked in anticipation of reinforce-
ment and then normalized and averaged behavioral
responses across experiments (see Experimental Proce-
dures). The dissipation in reinforcement responses shown
in Figures 6C and 6Dwas correlated with behavioral learn-
ing, indicating that reinforcement responses decline as
monkeys learn to predict reinforcement (Figures 6E and
6F; reward correlation, r = 0.89, p < 107; air-puff corre-
lation, r = 0.74, p < 104). A similar relationship between
the dissipation in reinforcement responses after reversal
and learning was not found when we performed the
same analysis on data from the 80% reinforced trace-
conditioning task. This appeared to be largely due to
a much smaller effect of reversal on reinforcement
responses in that task (Figure S5).
We next considered whether the dissipation in rein-
forcement responses during learning was correlated with
the time course of the evolving neural representation of
CS value. To test this idea, we derived an estimate of value
encoded by the amygdala as a function of trial number by
assuming that appetitive and aversive systems act as mu-
tual opponents in the brain (Daw et al., 2002; Grossberg,
1984; Solomon and Corbit, 1974). Accepting this assump-
tion, we take the difference between a given cell’s activity
on rewarded and punished trials as the ‘‘value signal’’
provided by that cell. For each neuron, we computed the
difference between the normalized (in the same manner
as for population PSTHs) level of activity on rewarded
and punished trials in 200 ms bins (shifted in 50 ms steps)
in each of the 20 trials after reversal. We then averaged976 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevierthese normalized ‘‘value signals’’ across neurons that
encoded positive and negative CS value, respectively,
during the 100% reinforced trace-conditioning task (Fig-
ures 7A and 7B). We defined a cell as encoding value if
neural responses to both images (during either or both
the visual stimulus or trace intervals) changed significantly
and in opposite directions when reinforcement contin-
gencies reversed (change point test, p < 0.05 after Bonfer-
roni correction) or if a change point test detected a change
in activity for only one image, but a two-way ANOVA, with
image value and image identity asmain factors, confirmed
a significant effect of image value (p < 0.05; Paton et al.,
2006). Positive value-coding cells fired more in response
to images associated with reward, and negative value-
coding cells fired more in response to images associated
with air-puff.
CS value coding, estimated as the average normalized
value signal from CS onset until the end of the trace inter-
val, evolved rapidly after reversal in cells encoding positive
and negative value (Figures 7C and 7D). The evolving rep-
resentation of CS value was correlated with the reduction
over successive trials of neural responses to USs (Figures
7E and 7F; reward responses, r =0.83, p < 105; air-puff
responses, r = 0.58, p < 0.01). Thus, the dynamics of
reinforcement responses are consistent with the notion
that this changing activity may be related to the process
of updating representations of value in the amygdala dur-
ing learning.
Multiple Signals Carried by Individual
Amygdala Neurons
Many amygdala neurons that modulated their response to
reinforcement in an expectation-dependent manner also
encoded other information. Here, we characterize and dis-
tinguish among three different signals often carried byInc.
Neuron
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Decrease during Learning
(A) Data from one experiment in which a neuron
responded more strongly to reward immedi-
ately after CS-US contingency reversal, and it
rapidly changed its firing rate to the two CSs
as reinforcement responses decreased. Black
curve, response to reward. Orange and blue
curves, visual stimulus interval responses to
each of the two images, respectively. Solid
and dashed lines, CS followed by reward or
air-puff, respectively.
(B) Data from another neuron that responded
more strongly to air-puff after image value
reversal. Orange and blue curves, trace-inter-
val responses to the two images, respectively.
Labeling conventions the same as in (A).
(C and D) Normalized and averaged neural
responses to rewards (C) and air-puffs (D) plot-
ted as a function of trial number relative to
reversal for neurons recorded during the
100% reinforced trace-conditioning task. (C)
rEM and nEM cells combined. (D) aEM and
nEM cells combined. Shaded regions, SEM.
(E and F) Correlation between mean responses
to reward (E) and air-puff (F) on the 20 trials af-
ter reversal, taken from the data points in (C)
and (D) and normalized and averaged behav-
ioral performance on the same trials (see
Experimental Procedures).
In all panels, trial 1 is the first trial after reversal
in image value.amygdala neurons: (1) the modulation of neural responses
to reinforcement by expectation, (2) the encoding of CS
value, and (3) neural responses selective for rewards or
aversive air-puffs. In addition, we have previously shown
that amygdala neurons often responded selectively to
the visual CSs themselves during the trace-conditioning
task (Paton et al., 2006).
One critical question regarding the different signals
carried by amygdala neurons concerns whether signals
encoding CS value may be instead described as encoding
pure prediction errors, such as those formulated by tem-
poral difference (TD) learning algorithms (Schultz et al.,
1997; Sutton and Barto, 1998). In TD learning, responses
to unexpected reinforcement transfer with learning so
that a response to the CS that predicts reinforcement
develops as the response to a previously unexpected
US disappears (Schultz et al., 1997). Thus, it is possible
that what appears to be a signal encoding CS value could
be better explained as simply encoding a TD error specific
for one valence of reinforcement. In this scenario, a neuron
encoding a pure TD error could have neural responses
to reinforcement modulated by expectation and neural
responses to CSs that reflect value. However, the
response profile of amygdala neurons encoding CS value
does not match the prototypical phasic, short latencyNeurresponse profile of neurons encoding TD errors. Across
the population of amygdala neurons, the representation
of CS value extends temporally from shortly after CS onset
and continues through the trace interval (Figures 8A–8D;
see also Paton et al., 2006). Very few neurons appear to
be candidates for encoding pure TD errors. Among neu-
rons encoding positive CS value within our sample, only
five had short latency, phasic value-related signals while
also modulating their responses to only rewards depend-
ing upon expectation. No neurons that we recorded
encoded negative value with an equivalent criterion; one
neuron showed a short latency but longer duration signal
encoding negative CS value.
Although these six cells are candidates for encoding
a relatively pure prediction error, closer inspection reveals
that they differ from pure TD errors in a number of ways
(Figure S6). First, these cells exhibit reinforcement selec-
tivity that ismaintained after learning, whereas a prediction
error should lose its US selectivity when an animal learns
to predict reinforcement. Second, these cells exhibit a ro-
bust excitatory response to the CS conditioned with the
opposite value to the preferred one. Overall, within the
population of amygdala cells we recorded, we did not
identify a single example of a cell whose response pro-
file was consistent with its encoding a pure TD-styleon 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 977
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Reinforcement Is Correlated with the
Evolving Representation of Value in the
Amygdala
(A and B) Color maps showing the representa-
tion of value during reversal learning as a func-
tion of trial number and of time within trials.
Positive (A) and negative (B) CS value-coding
cells from the 100% reinforcement probability
trace-conditioning task shown separately.
Vertical white lines, CS onset (solid line) and
US onset (dashed line). Each 200ms bin shows
the difference in firing rate between rewarded
and punished trials; bins were advanced in
50 ms steps. Trial 1, first trial after reversal.
Bin starting at time 0, interval from 0–200 ms
after CS onset.
(C and D) CS value-coding extracted from the
color map by taking themean value in the inter-
val between the white lines for neurons encod-
ing positive (C) and negative (D) CS value.
(E and F) Recorded reinforcement responses
(data points from Figures 6C and 6D) plotted
against the evolution of CS value coding (data
points from [C] and [D]) during trials 1–20 after
reversal. Regression lines are shown in blue
and red.prediction error signal. Since cells that have reinforcement
responses modulated by expectation are not well de-
scribed as carrying pure TD errors, neural responses re-
flecting CS value and neural responses to reinforcement
modulated by expectation therefore appear to be sepa-
rate signals carried by amygdala neurons.
Amygdala neurons also often carry a third type of signal:
selectivity for rewards and air-puffs. We used an ROC
analysis to construct a reinforcement selectivity index for
each cell, with ROC values >0.5 indicating that a cell re-
sponded more strongly to rewards than air-puffs. One
hundred seventy-eight out of two hundred eighty-five cells
recorded had a selective response to the type of reinforce-
ment (ROC different from 0.5, permutation test, p < 0.05,
two-tailed), with 103 neurons preferring rewards and 75
neurons preferring air-puffs. Of the 103 selective for re-
ward, 20 showed no significant response to air-puff, 45
showed inhibition, and 38 showed excitation. Of the 75
cells selective for air-puff, 41 showed no response to
reward, 20 showed inhibition, and 14 showed excitation
(Table S2). The rates at which we find cells that exhibit re-
inforcement selectivity did not vary significantly across the
five monkeys (c2 test, p > 0.05; Table S3). In addition, we
did not find any significant relationship between reinforce-
ment selectivity and the modulation of reinforcement re-
sponses by expectation (Figure S7).978 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 ElsevierOn average, neurons encoding positive and negative
CS value maintained higher levels of activity after rewards
and air-puffs, respectively (Figures 8A–8D; see also Fig-
ures 7A and 7B). Indeed, the majority of neurons encoding
positive CS value had reinforcement selectivity indices
>0.5, and the majority of neurons encoding negative CS
value had reinforcement selectivity indices <0.5 (inset his-
tograms, Figures 8A–8D). US selectivity was similar for the
trace-conditioning and random tasks, as revealed by a sig-
nificant correlation between indices representing US se-
lectivity in each task (r = 0.66, p < 104, and r = 0.79,
p < 103 for comparisons between the random task and
the trace-conditioning tasks with 100% and 80% rein-
forcement probabilities, respectively). These observations
are consistent with the idea that amygdala neurons may
continually encode the value of sensory events in the en-
vironment, whether those events predict reinforcement
(CSs) or are reinforcements themselves (USs).
The modulation of reinforcement responses depending
upon expectation is often superimposed on signals
representing CS and US value (Figures 8E and 8F);
in fact, 34/116 (29%) and 27/169 (16%) neurons carried
all three signals in the 100% and 80% reinforcement
probability versions of the trace-conditioning task,
respectively. Moreover, for the neurons studied when
reinforcement probability was 100%, the presence of anInc.
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tiple Signals
(A–D) Normalized and averaged population
PSTHs from neurons encoding positive (A
and C) and negative (B and D) CS value during
the trace-conditioning task with 100% (A and
B) and 80% (C and D) reinforcement probabil-
ity, respectively. Data aligned at CS onset;
reinforcement occurred at either 1.8 or 1.85 s
depending upon the experiment. Shading,
SEM. Inset histograms, ROC reinforcement se-
lectivity indices for each of the positive (A and
C) and negative (B and D) value-coding neu-
rons. Neurons encoding positive CS value
tend to have reinforcement selectivity indices
>0.5, and neurons encoding negative CS value
tend to have reinforcement selectivity indices
<0.5.
(E and F) Venn diagram showing the number of
neurons classified as encoding CS value, as
having reinforcement selective responses,
and as having significantly stronger responses
to unexpected compared to expected rewards
and/or punishments for the trace-conditioning
task with 100% (E) and 80% (F) reinforcement
probabilities, respectively.expectation-modulated reinforcement response was as-
sociated with a higher probability that the neuron encoded
CS value (c2 test, p < 0.005). Forty-five of the sixty-five
neurons showing stronger responses to unexpected com-
pared to expected reinforcement also encoded CS value,
whereas only 21 out of the 51 remaining neurons encoded
value. These data suggest that these different signals may
be linked during the process of learning about value. How-
ever, we did not find that this relationship between signals
also applied to the neurons studied during the 80% rein-
forced trace-conditioning task (c2 test, p = 0.4), perhaps
because CSs do not fully predict reinforcement when
delivery occurs with a probability of 80%.
DISCUSSION
We have examined the responses of amygdala neurons to
rewards and aversive air-puffs during two tasks: a trace-
conditioning procedure in which monkeys learned to pre-
dict reinforcement based on CSs, and a ‘‘random’’ task, in
which reinforcement occurred unpredictably. Our centralNeurfinding is that expectation frequently modulated amygdala
neurons’ responses to rewards and aversive stimuli. Dur-
ing the trace-conditioning task, on average, neural
responses were larger when monkeys incorrectly pre-
dicted rewards or air-puffs (Figure 4). Furthermore, by
testing every neuron with both expected and unexpected
rewards and punishments, we identified two different
populations of neurons in the amygdala. The activity of
some amygdala neurons reflects a valence-specific effect
of expectation on responses to pleasant or aversive stim-
uli, but not both; the activity of other amygdala neurons
reflects similar effects of expectation on responses to
reinforcements of both valences (Figure 3).
The two groups of neurons we have described could
underlie the role of the amygdala in integrating a wide
array of sensory information in order to drive physiological,
cognitive, and behavioral responses related to emotion
(Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Baxter and Murray, 2002;
Everitt et al., 2003; Holland and Gallagher, 1999; Lang
and Davis, 2006; LeDoux, 2000; McGaugh, 2004; Paz
et al., 2006; Phelps, 2006; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005).on 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 979
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ior, are specific to stimulus valence (positive or negative
value). Other processes, such as arousal, attention, and
memory formation enhancement, are instead sensitive to
stimulus intensity regardless of valence. The different
types of expectation modulation we have described in
amygdala neurons may play specific roles in each of these
two sorts of processes.
Although valence-nonspecific effects of expectation on
reinforcement responses could derive from or contribute
to processes like generalized attention and arousal, va-
lence-specific effects of expectation cannot be easily
explained by such processes. For example, one might
hypothesize that generalized attention or arousal could
modulate neural activity in a valence-specific manner if
(1) a neuron responds to only reward or punishment, and
(2) attention or arousal changes the gain of the neuron’s
responses. However, the effects of expectation on neural
responses were unrelated to neurons’ inherent selectivity
for rewards or air-puffs (Figure S7). Moreover, as shown in
Figures 3A and 3B, on average rEM cells actually re-
sponded more strongly to expected air-puffs than to ex-
pected rewards. Therefore, neurons with valence-specific
effects of expectation likely reflect their specific connec-
tivity with neural circuits that process rewards or aversive
stimuli in relation to expectation, but not both. Consistent
with this notion, in 21 experiments, multiple neurons with
different properties—valence-specific and valence-non-
specific effects of expectation—were recorded simulta-
neously. Generalized attention or arousal is unlikely to
account for the different response properties of these
neurons. Instead, one would have to invoke multiple types
of attention and/or arousal mechanisms, including some
that are valence-specific, to explain how neurons with
different properties were recorded simultaneously.
The modulation of reinforcement responses by expec-
tation that we describe in amygdala neurons bears some
similarity to prediction error signals. Prediction error sig-
nals have been proposed to play an important role in asso-
ciative learning, albeit in somewhat different ways de-
pending upon the theoretical approach. For example, in
the trial-based Rescorla-Wagner formulation (Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972), prediction error signals indicate the
sign and magnitude of the adjustment required to predict
reinforcement accurately in the future and thereby could
act as teaching signals that update neural representations
of value. TD learning algorithms generalize the trial-based
Rescorla-Wagner formulation to characterize prediction
errors in real-time and posit a similar role for prediction er-
ror signals (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In TD learning algo-
rithms, error signals are continuously computed by taking
the difference in the value of two successive ‘‘states,’’
where a state is roughly defined as the overall situation.
In the context of our study, we may conceptualize a trial
as containing two states: one initiated by CS presentation
and the other by US presentation. In this scenario, both
a CS that is known to predict a particular US and a surpris-
ing US could cause a phasic prediction error signal in980 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Ia cell. Midbrain dopamine neurons appear to encode re-
ward prediction error signals as defined by TD models
(Schultz et al., 1997), but punishment prediction error sig-
nals, to our knowledge, have not been described at the
cellular level. Error signals also play a role in attention-
based models of reinforcement learning; in this formula-
tion, these signals serve to enhance the associability of
the CS during learning by modulating attention to the CS
(Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980).
Although the fact that expectation can modulate amyg-
dala responses to reinforcement is reminiscent of TD pre-
diction error signals, it is clear that in general amygdala
neurons do not simply encode ‘‘pure’’ TD errors. Amyg-
dala neurons carry a number of other signals, including
signals selective for visual stimulus identity (Paton et al.,
2006), temporally extended signals that are selective for
CS value (Paton et al., 2006), and signals selective for
USs (Figure 8). Moreover, the vast majority of amygdala
neurons (including those that display expectation-depen-
dent modulation of reinforcement responses) do not have
phasic CS responses after learning that are consistent
with TD error signals. Even those neurons with phasic
CS value signals and with expectation-modulated rein-
forcement responses exhibit other response properties
(Figure S6). Thus, the response profile of amygdala neu-
rons differs from what has been ascribed to dopamine
neurons for learning about reward (Schultz et al., 1997).
In addition, few amygdala neurons appear to have activity
that reflects ‘‘negative’’ reward or punishment prediction
errors (Figure 5). Negative prediction errors occur when
the reinforcement received is smaller than that expected
or omitted altogether, and our data revealed a weak and
infrequent representation of omitted reinforcement of
both valences in the amygdala.
The convergence of two types of signals—those related
to value (for both CSs and USs) and those related to the
predictability of reinforcement—suggests that changes
in neural responses to CSs during learning may arise
from the reciprocal interactions between these signals
within the amygdala. Consistent with this notion, we found
that reinforcement responses dissipated during learning,
as monkeys learned to predict reinforcement (Figure 6).
The dynamics of this dissipation were correlated with be-
havioral learning about value (Figure 6) and with the evolv-
ing representation of value in the amygdala (Figure 7). To-
gether, these data link neural reinforcement responses
that aremodulated by expectation to the dynamic process
of learning about value at the neural and behavioral levels.
However, since different populations of amygdala neu-
rons represent expectation in either a valence-specific
(Figures 3A–3D) or valence-nonspecific (Figures 3E and
3F) manner, the mechanism by which expectation-modu-
lated reinforcement signals may help induce learning
about value remain unclear. Neurons in which expectation
modulates reinforcement responses in a valence-specific
manner may not be the only type that participates in learn-
ing about value. Neurons that have enhanced responses
for both unexpected rewards and punishments still couldnc.
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tention-based theories of reinforcement learning (Mackin-
tosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980). In fact, the amygdala
has been proposed to play a critical role in processing
the influence of surprising rewards on learning (Holland
and Gallagher, 2006); and surprising punishments could
have the same effect on attention-based learning mecha-
nisms.
In principle, expectation could modulate reinforcement
responses in the amygdala through a local, de novo com-
putation, or these responses could reflect inputs that al-
ready represent unexpected reinforcement. The amyg-
dala is reciprocally connected with numerous brain
structures—such asmidbrain dopamine neurons and pre-
frontal cortex—where expectation-modulated reinforce-
ment signals may also be represented (Schultz and Dick-
inson, 2000). The physiological responses we observe
may therefore derive from these inputs. We tend to favor
this interpretation because many aspects of amygdala
neural responses, reviewed above, are inconsistent with
the idea that these neurons simply compute a TD-style
prediction error. Instead, the observed effects of expecta-
tion on reinforcement responses may reflect a physiologi-
cal signature of error signal input fromother structures and
therefore are consistent with the notion that the amygdala
may be a site of convergence and interaction for value and
error signals.
In addition to the representation of positive and negative
value in the amygdala (Paton et al., 2006), a number of
brain structures—including orbitofrontal, cingulate, and
parietal cortices, and the basal ganglia—have been
shown to contain single neurons that encode the reward
value of stimuli and/or of potential motor actions (Dorris
and Glimcher, 2004; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Roesch and Olson, 2004;
Salzman et al., 2005; Samejima et al., 2005; Sugrue
et al., 2004, 2005). Neurophysiological recordings have
shown evidence of reward responses modified by expec-
tation in many of these areas (Schultz and Dickinson,
2000), including the amygdala (Sugase-Miyamoto and
Richmond, 2005). However, unlike the present study,
previous studies have not tested whether neurons repre-
sent both pleasant and aversive stimuli in relation to
expectation, thus revealing how neurons differentially
integrate information from appetitive and aversive sys-
tems. Moreover, previous work typically has not
described the time course of these signals in relation to
learning on a trial-by-trial basis, and these studies have
not simultaneously examined these signals in relation to
an evolving neural representation of value. Recently,
experiments using fMRI have suggested that BOLD re-
sponses reflect both reward (Haruno and Kawato, 2006;
O’Doherty et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2005) and punish-
ment (Ploghaus et al., 2000; Seymour et al., 2004, 2005)
prediction error in the cerebellum, orbitofrontal, parietal,
right insula and cingulate cortices, ventral striatum, and
the hippocampus. Despite its long history of being impli-
cated in aversive learning (LeDoux, 2000; Paton et al.,Neur2006), only one recent study has identified the amygdala
as having a BOLD signal reflecting punishment error sig-
nals by usingmonetary loss as an aversive stimulus (Yacu-
bian et al., 2006). In this study, however, reward prediction
error signals were not identified in the amygdala, perhaps
because of the limited spatial and temporal resolution of
fMRI.
Compared to investigations of how expectation modu-
lates reward responses, much less information is available
concerning how expectation may modulate responses to
aversive stimuli. Although dopamine neurons are fre-
quently described as representing reward error signals,
conflicting data exist concerning whether dopamine neu-
rons also provide a phasic response to unexpected aver-
sive stimuli (Guarraci et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000; Mireno-
wicz and Schultz, 1996; Ungless, 2004). Dopamine
neurons have been found to be active tonically during
stress (Anstrom and Woodward, 2005), and recent evi-
dence indicates that dopaminemay play a role in fear con-
ditioning and in modulating amygdala processing (Grace
and Rosenkranz, 2002; Marowsky et al., 2005; Nader
and LeDoux, 1999). Serotonergic neurons, which also
project to the amygdala (Amaral et al., 1992), are another
candidate source for signals about unexpected aversive
stimuli. Opponent appetitive and aversive systems have
long been proposed as a basis for critical aspects of rein-
forcement learning and affective behavior (Grossberg,
1984; Solomon and Corbit, 1974). A recent proposal sug-
gests that, for aversive processing, the serotonergic sys-
tem may mirror the role of the dopaminergic system in
reward (Daw et al., 2002), but neurophysiological evi-
dence demonstrating this is lacking. Thus, establishing
the direction and nature of interactions between brain
areas involved in appetitive and aversive processing
remains an important goal for understanding how neural
circuits implement reinforcement learning.
Motivated by a conceptual framework in which stimulus
valence and intensity both contribute to our emotional ex-
perience, we have examined the activity of single neurons
in the amygdala to both predictable and unpredictable
pleasant and aversive stimuli. We discovered that expec-
tationmodulates responses to reinforcement in a valence-
specific manner in some neurons and in a valence-non-
specific manner in other neurons. These different types
of response properties may underlie the role of the amyg-
dala inmultiple processes related to emotion, including re-
inforcement learning, attention, and arousal. Future work
must develop experimental approaches for unraveling
the complex anatomical circuitry and mechanisms by
which amygdala neurons influence learning and the
many emotional processes related to the valence and in-
tensity of reinforcing stimuli.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
General Methods
During experiments, monkeys sat in a Plexiglas primate chair (Crist
Instruments) with their eyes 57 cm in front of a 21’’ Sony CRT monitor.on 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 981
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have been described previously (Paton et al., 2006). All animal proce-
dures conformed to NIH guidelines and were approved by the Institu-
tional Animal Care and use Committees at New York State Psychiatric
institute and Columbia University.
Behavior
Trace-Conditioning Task
We used a trace-conditioning procedure to induce learning about the
reinforcement associated with three visual CSs (novel fractal patterns)
in every experiment. To begin a trial, monkeys foveated a fixation point
(FP). After 1 s, an 8 degree square image (CS) appeared over the fovea
for 300 or 350ms. During fixation, monkeys maintained gaze within 3.5
degrees of the FP, as measured with an Applied Science Laboratories
infrared eye tracker sampling at 240 Hz. After image and FP disappear-
ance and a 1.5 s trace interval, US delivery occurred with a 100% or
80% probability (for the 100% and 80% reinforced versions of the
task, respectively). USs were liquid rewards (0.1–0.9 ml of water),
a 50–100 ms, 40–60 psi aversive air-puff, or nothing. Air-puff delivery
occurred at one of two possible locations on the monkey’s face cho-
sen randomly on every trial. All three trial types were presented in
blockwise randomized order (two to three trials of each type random-
ized within a block), with a 3–3.5 s intertrial interval. We reversed CS
value assignments without warning, with an initially rewarded CS
now followed by air-puff, and vice-versa for the punished CS. We
assessed monkeys’ learning by measuring licking and blinking re-
sponses (see below). Other than differing in reinforcement probability,
the 80% and 100% reinforced versions of the task differed in that one
CS on the 100% task was non-reinforced and never reversed, whereas
the equivalent CS on the 80% task was associated with a small reward
and never reversed.
Random Task
This procedure typically followed the trace-conditioning task. With no
behavioral requirements enforced, monkeys were presented randomly
with rewards and air-puffs of the exact same duration and magnitude
as during the trace-conditioning task. Times between the administra-
tions of reinforcement were generated from a truncated exponential
distribution with a mean of 5–6 s, minimum of 3.5 s, and maximum
of 15–20 s. Within an experiment, air-puffs and rewards occurred
randomly and with equal frequency.
Behavioral Measures
The same behavioral measures were used in both tasks. To measure
licking, we measured every ms whether the monkey’s tongue interrup-
ted an infrared beam passed between the monkey’s mouth and the re-
ward delivery tube positioned 1–2 cm away. Our eye tracker registered
anticipatory blinking by outputting a characteristic voltage when the
eye closed, which we verified as corresponding to eye closures as vi-
sualized from an infrared camera thatmonitored themonkey during the
experiment. For quantitative analysis of behavioral learning, we scored
each trial according to whether the monkey licked and/or closed its
eyes in the 500 ms preceding reinforcement.
Data Collection
We recorded neural activity from 365 neurons in the right amygdala of
five rhesusmonkeys (Macacamulatta) weighing 4–14 kg. One hundred
ninety-six neurons were recorded during the 100% reinforced trace-
conditioning procedure. We also studied 116 of these neurons during
the random task. In addition, we recorded the activity of 169 neurons
on the 80% reinforced trace-conditioning task and the random task.
We positioned recording chambers directly over the amygdala based
on MRI. In each experiment, we individually advanced 1–4 metal
microelectrodes (FHC Instruments) into the brain through guide tubes
using either a hydraulic microdrive (Narishige) or a motorized multi-
electrode drive (NAN). Guide tubes were supported within a grid with
holes spaced 1 mm or 1.3 mm apart. We used the Plexon system for
signal amplification, filtering, digitizing of spike waveforms, and spike
sorting using a principal component analysis platform (on-line with982 Neuron 55, 970–984, September 20, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Ioff-line verification). We included all well-isolated neurons in this study;
monkeys either performed a fixation task or no task during the search
for well-isolated neurons. MRI images were used to reconstruct the
borders of the amygdala and recording sites (Figure 1C). The neuronal
sample was taken from an overlapping region, predominantly the
basolateral region, of the amygdala in each monkey.
Data Analysis
We analyzed responses to USs during an epoch spanning from 50–
600 ms after US onset, which we selected on the basis of an analysis
of response latency and duration. Briefly, we compared activity from
a baseline period, the last 500 ms of the trace interval, to activity in
the 800 ms following US onset. We first constructed distributions of
the number of spikes in 20 ms bins, shifted by 1 ms, across the base-
line interval. Next, we determined which 20 ms bins, slid in 1 ms steps,
met a criterion response during the 800ms after US onset. Criterion for
an excitatory response was met if at least 20 consecutive overlapping
bins exceeded 99% of the baseline activity, and for an inhibitory re-
sponse if at least 20 consecutive bins contained fewer spikes than
95% of baseline bins. Latency was defined as the beginning of the first
of 20 consecutive significant bins. Ninety percent of latencies were
greater than 50 ms. We used 600 ms as the end of the reinforcement
epoch because a similar analysis found that 90% of cells had a re-
sponse duration of 568 ms or less. Using customized time windows
for air-puff and reward did not change the central findings reported
here, so we use the 50–600 ms window for both reinforcements. We
also used this type of latency analysis to determine whether a neuron
increased or decreased its response when rewards and punishments
are omitted, during the 80% reinforced trace-conditioning task. For
trials with omitted reinforcement, we designated the earliest possible
onset of a response as the normal time of US delivery had it not
been omitted.
ROC Analyses
We used an ROC analysis adapted from signal detection theory
(Green and Swets, 1966) for three analyses. In general, the outcome
of these analyses is not different when using other nonparametric
statistical techniques. We chose to use ROC analysis because it pro-
vides an index that quantifies the degree and sign of the separation
between two distributions without making assumptions about their
shapes. For all ROC analyses, we assess statistical significance
with permutation tests, in which we shuffle data 1000 times in order
to evaluate whether an ROC value computed on the data was signif-
icantly greater than 95% of the shuffled values (p < 0.05, one-tailed
test), or greater than 97.5% or less than 2.5% of the shuffled values
(p < 0.05, two-tailed test). The basic results we report in this paper
remain consistent if we used more stringent statistical criteria, such
as p < 0.01.
The first ROC analysis determined whether unexpected compared
to expected reinforcement modulated amygdala neural activity. We
compared responses to USs in the trace-conditioning task (expected
USs) to responses from the random task (unexpected USs) to identify
three categories of neurons: rEM, aEM, and nEM neurons. For this
analysis, we considered trials from both the 100% reinforced and
80% reinforced trace-conditioning tasks to be ‘‘expected’’ reinforce-
ment trials. Unexpected responses were the responses to the same
reinforcement presentedduring the random task.Of course,when rein-
forcement is actually received after a CS predicts reinforcement with
80% probability, there may be a small positive prediction error (since
the monkey is not expecting reward with 100% probability). However,
the presence of this small prediction error would actually make it more
difficult to detect a difference between these trials and the unexpected
reinforcement trials from the random task.
The second ROC analysis compared responses to expected re-
wards and air-puffs, determining whether a neuron fired more strongly
to rewards or air-puffs. For the two analyses described so far, ROC
values greater than 0.5 indicated cells that fired more strongly whennc.
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rewards.
The third ROC analysis was performed to determine the latency and
duration of signals encoding CS value. We compared neural activity
from trials when a CS was associated with a reward to trials when
the same CS was associated with an air-puff. We computed ROC
values in 100 ms bins, stepping in 20 ms increments, from CS onset
until US onset, again using a permutation test to assess statistical sig-
nificance. We defined value signal latency as the time of the first signif-
icant bin of at least four consecutive significant bins with the same
valence of value coding and value signal duration as spanning from
the first to the last significant bin.
Population PSTHs
Before averaging neural activity across cells in 10 ms nonoverlapping
bins, we normalized data from each experiment by subtracting the
mean and dividing by the standard deviation of baseline activity. We
used the last 1000 ms before FP onset or US onset as the baseline
for the trace-conditioning and random tasks, respectively. Distribu-
tions of baseline activity combined data from all trials from both tasks
so that only one computed mean and standard deviation was used for
normalization of each neuron.We smoothed each PSTH by convolving
it with a 50 ms Gaussian at half-width.
Behavioral Learning Curves
To quantify learning, we normalized and averaged behavioral re-
sponses across all experiments in which unexpected reward or air-
puff significantly increased reinforcement responses. We first scored
each of the 20 trials before and after reversal as a response (1) or no
response (0). We then divided each trial’s response by the mean be-
havioral response across trials, and subtracted the mean of the nor-
malized values from each individual normalized value. We multiplied
by 1 normalized responses that decreased after reversal, so that
the slope of learning curves was always positive. We did this sepa-
rately for learning about positive-to-negative and negative-to-positive
reversals, so that we could compare each type of learning to the re-
sponses to rewards and punishments during learning (see Figures
6E and 6F).
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://
www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/55/6/970/DC1/.
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